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To Strengthen Human Rights, Change the OAS  
(Not the Commission)
by Santiago A. Canton*
IntroductIon
Once again, the 34 active Member States of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) have engaged in a pro-
cess to reform the Inter-American 
System for Human Rights (IASHR, 
the System), particularly the Inter-
American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR, the Commission). 
And, once again, the process is likely 
to end with minor, symbolic changes, 
mainly oriented toward pleasing the 
Member States. However, there are 
actual substantive changes needed 
to strengthen the System — reforms 
that the Commission and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR, the Court) have presented to the OAS for more than 
a decade, reforms requested by civil society and the victims of 
human rights violations who rely on the System as a last resort 
for justice, and reforms that will likely, once again, be ignored.
This article is divided into two parts. Part I evaluates the 
impact of the System on the Member States of the OAS. Any 
strengthening process must start with an evaluation of the results 
arising from the work of the Commission and Court as well 
as their impact on both Member States and individuals. Only 
after that exercise is done is it possible to determine the needs 
for a reform that effectively strengthens the System. Though 
the impact of the Commission and the Court can be seen on 
a wide range of issues, this article 
specifically emphasizes the role they 
played in advancing democracy and 
strengthening the rule of law, as these 
two aspects are central in the current 
reform process. In addition, these 
two aspects are particularly impor-
tant, considering that many States 
and the OAS Secretary General have 
maintained that the strengthening of 
democracy and the rule of law is not 
a mandate of the Commission and 
that any work in that regard should 
be limited to the States and the 
General Secretariat.
Part II takes a look at the reforms 
needed to strengthen the System. 
I have not focused on the current 
debate to reform the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, as 
I believe that a more comprehensive approach is needed and that 
the strengthening of the IASHR goes through a different path 
than just another round of lip service to the Rules. Any com-
prehensive reform agenda must include a change of the OAS. 
A substantive reform of the OAS would not only significantly 
resolve most of the challenges of the System, but it would also 
help to redefine the role of an organization that, with the excep-
tion of its work on human rights, has become outdated in a fast 
changing region that is turning its back on this once relevant 
regional organization.
Part I: ImPact of the Inter-amerIcan SyStem  
for human rIghtS
the Inter-amerIcan commISSIon’S role In the 
PromotIon of democracy and the rule of law 
through VISItS and rePortS.
Any serious attempt to strengthen the System must first take 
into consideration the extraordinary results of the System, which 
is arguably the most efficient of all the international mechanisms 
for the protection of human rights.
Few would disagree that the work of the IACHR during the 
1970s was critical in denouncing the massive human rights vio-
lations committed by brutal dictatorships and during the 1980s 
and 1990s was crucial in supporting the return of democracy. 
The Commission’s work, including its country visits, requests 
for information, and reports on various human rights situations, 
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helped reduce the number of violations and alerted the interna-
tional community to grave human rights violations.
The Commission’s 1979 country visit to Argentina was 
a pivotal point in the history of the System; its work helped 
strengthen and define the role of the Commission in preventing 
violations and advancing the rule of law in Latin America. As 
Jorge E. Taiana, a former Executive Secretary of the IACHR 
and Foreign Minister of Argentina, said, “[W]e were confident 
that the visit of the Commission would curb the abductions and 
weaken the genocidal dictatorship; that from then on, it would 
be less likely that prisoners would be dragged from their cells 
and shot[.]”1
Thirty years later, in June 2009, after the coup d’état 
in Honduras, the work of the Commission remained equally 
relevant.2 Immediately after the coup, the Commission issued 
a press release condemning the coup and it conducted a coun-
try visit that allowed it to inform the international community 
of the human rights violations being carried out by the police 
and military. Promptly following the coup, the IACHR granted 
precautionary measures, which are emergency interim direc-
tives designed to protect victims. These precautionary measures 
called on the Honduran government to protect the life and per-
sonal integrity of more than 500 people, curbing the threat of 
further human rights violations in the country. The role of the 
Commission in denouncing human rights violations by military 
dictatorships is as relevant today as it was three decades ago.
From the 1979 report on Argentina to the most recent report 
on Honduras, the Commission’s visits and country reports have 
offered much needed independent evaluations of the state of 
human rights in the countries of the region. In addition, the 
reports’ findings have empowered civil society organizations 
throughout the region by providing them international support 
for the issues they champion.
ImPact of the IndIVIdual PetItIon SyStem
In addition to the political role of the Commission in 
strengthening democracy and the rule of law through visits and 
reports for the past four decades, its role in advancing the same 
goals through the individual petition system is equally, if not 
more, important. Several decisions of the Commission have been 
instrumental in facilitating institutional changes in countries of 
the region, resulting in decisive steps toward the strengthen-
ing of democracy and the rule of law. Cases decided by the 
Commission regarding amnesty laws, women’s participation in 
politics, military justice, and freedom of expression are only a 
few examples of how the work of the IASHR has transformed 
Latin America in ways unthinkable only fifteen years ago.
Amnesty Laws and Impunity for Grave Human Rights 
Violations
I believe the most important decisions of the IASHR are three 
cases decided in the fall of 1992 against El Salvador, Argentina, 
and Uruguay.3 With these three decisions, the Commission 
laid the groundwork for the most important legal contribution 
in the Americas toward strengthening democracy and fight-
ing impunity in the region and the world: that amnesty laws 
are in violation of international human rights law. Since these 
decisions, both the Commission and the Court have enriched the 
legal foundations of the initial decisions and helped to initiate 
a process that is resulting in the prosecution and sentencing of 
the individuals responsible for the destruction of the democratic 
system, together with the killings, torture, and disappearance of 
thousands of people.
Integration of Women into Governance
Active and equal participation of women in politics is essential 
for the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law in coun-
tries across the region and the world. On December 28, 2000, 
the government of Argentina and the IACHR signed a landmark 
friendly settlement to ensure that women compose at least thirty 
percent of Argentina’s Congress.4 Although this percentage 
is not ideal, it was a remarkable step toward full equality and 
participation. The friendly settlement that reformed Argentina’s 
electoral code also stipulated sanctions for non-compliance with 
the law.
Military Justice
With a track record of serious human rights violations, many 
armed forces in Latin America have managed to enjoy impunity 
by guaranteeing that any prosecution against them be conducted 
under a military justice system, therefore ensuring a judgment 
by their peers and leniency resulting from the irregular legal pro-
cedure. In contrast, the Commission and Court have consistently 
held that military courts are not the appropriate procedure for 
prosecution of human rights violations.
Through a friendly settlement with the Commission in 
November 2007, Argentina repealed its military code and 
adopted a civilian court procedure for crimes committed by mili-
tary officers.5 In another groundbreaking decision, the Mexican 
National Supreme Court of Justice decided to restrict the com-
petence of military tribunals in cases where army personnel are 
accused of human rights violations, based on the IACtHR deci-
sion in the case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico.6
Freedom of Expression
For more than two decades, the protection of freedom of 
expression has been a pillar of the work of the Inter-American 
System. Both the Commission and the Court have used all the 
tools at their disposal to protect the right to freedom of expres-
sion: advisory opinions, individual petition decisions, friendly 
settlements, country visits, reports, and the creation of a Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.
The Court’s Advisory Opinion No. 5 laid the groundwork 
for the defense of freedom of expression as a key aspect of 
a democratic system, holding that freedom of expression is 
the cornerstone of a democratic society.7 As a consequence 
of the System’s decisions, the Chilean Congress reformed the 
country’s Constitution and adopted a freedom of information 
law. For decades, the desacato laws have been used across 
the region to suppress the criticism of government authorities. 
However, in 1992 a friendly settlement included the repeal of 
the desacato law from Argentine legislation8 and a report from 
the Commission established desacato laws as incompatible with 
2
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol20/iss2/2
7
the American Convention on Human Rights.9 As a consequence 
of that report and the Commission’s follow-up, desacato laws 
were also repealed in Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. In the 
cases of Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica10 and Kimel v. Argentina,11 
the Court decided that criminal prosecution for slander and libel, 
in cases of public interest, are also used to silence ideas and 
opinions. Because of the decision in the Kimel case, Argentina 
became the first country in the region to repeal libel and slander 
laws from the criminal code in cases of public interest.
guIdIng JuStIce acroSS the regIon
In recent decades, judges all over the region have incorpo-
rated the jurisprudence of the System in their domestic deci-
sions. In so doing, an Inter-American corpus iuris is rapidly 
emerging and strengthening the rule of law with a human rights 
perspective. This article has given just a few of the multitude of 
examples of constitutional change, approval of new legislation, 
repeal of harmful laws, implementation of public policies, and 
denunciation of violations that 
have resulted from the work of 
the System.
In fact, it is possible to 
argue that the System has 
done more for strengthening 
democracy, the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights in the 
Americas than any other inter-
governmental institution. Yet, if 
the Inter-American System has 
been so effective in protect-
ing and defending human rights and strengthening democracy 
and the rule of law, why such a strong interest by some States 
in reforming the System? Unfortunately, the current reform 
process does not answer this question and is instead addressing 
the same procedural issues that have already been discussed in 
past reforms, and likely will result in changes to the Rules of 
Procedures and practices of the Commission and Court, all with 
the acceptance and approval by most Member States. In all the 
previous cases, however, while the Commission and Court pro-
ceeded with the reforms of the Rules, the States failed to make 
the changes that could have effectively strengthened the System, 
including universality, compliance, and a substantive budget 
increase. The reform process is walking the same path as before, 
and unless more substantive changes are included in the agenda, 
the Commission and Court will walk out of this process, unfor-
tunately once again, without any new real strength to protect and 
defend human rights.
Part II: changeS for a real  
StrengthenIng of the SyStem
For at least the last twelve years, the Commission has annu-
ally presented OAS Member States with what it considers to be 
the main challenges of the System: universality, compliance, 
and budget increase. While the Commission’s recommendations 
have always been given lip service, with the stated endorsement 
of most Member States, they have never translated into substan-
tive changes. In addition to those three, I will mention other 
changes that are not part of the discussion but are significantly 
more relevant — not only because they will strengthen the 
human rights system but also because they could help transition 
the OAS out of its current state of irrelevance for the region.
take concrete StePS to achIeVe unIVerSalIty
Both the Commission and the Court have insisted on the 
need to have a universal system. It is unacceptable that fifty 
years after the creation of the System many countries have not 
yet ratified all the human rights treaties. This is clearly a respon-
sibility of the States, and there is very little that the Commission 
and Court can do in this respect.
If the States are serious about the importance of a univer-
sal system, they should take concrete steps. The OAS General 
Assembly, in addition to the Resolution passed every year call-
ing for universality, should select a group of foreign ministers 
from countries that have ratified all the human rights instru-
ments to travel to the other Member States and promote the 
need for universal ratification. 
Furthermore, the OAS Secretary 
General, besides invoking the 
regular rhetoric of universality, 
should embark on a continuous 
effort with all Member States 
to ensure universal ratifica-
tion. For the last few decades, 
universal ratification has never 
been a priority for the Secretary 
General.
Integrate Inter-amerIcan JurISPrudence wIth 
Internal legISlatIon and eStablISh a SPecIal 
raPPorteur on comPlIance
Despite the important markers of success of the IASHR, 
States do not fully comply with a large majority of its decisions. 
The challenge of compliance is not unique to the IASHR. In the 
international human rights architecture, compliance with the 
decisions of the supervisory bodies is always one of the main 
challenges.
Considering that compliance is one of the principal raisons 
d’être of any human rights system, States should pass inter-
nal legislation to ensure compliance with the decisions of the 
Commission and Court. In the region, only three countries have 
such legislation (Peru, Costa Rica, and Colombia), though none 
of these States provides an ideal model to follow.
The OAS political bodies, in consultation with the 
Commission and Court, can help the countries of the region by 
providing the parameters for a model law of compliance that can 
facilitate the passing of national legislation.
In addition, the Commission should appoint a Special 
Rapporteur on Compliance. The Rapporteur should not only 
get information about the state of compliance but should also 
provide support and communicate between the States and the 
organs of the System to ensure full compliance with decisions. 
The Special Rapporteur should present its findings to a Special 
[I]t is possible to argue that the 
System has done more for strengthening 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights in the Americas than 
any other inter-governmental institution.
3
Canton: To Strengthen Human Rights, Change the OAS (Not the Commission)
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
8
Meeting of the Permanent Council, which should be open to the 
active participation of victims and their representatives.
comPly wIth the oaS charter by ProVIdIng the 
SyStem wIth the budget requIred to accomPlISh  
the taSkS aSSIgned to It
With a budget of less than USD $5 million, the Commission 
is significantly underfunded and unable to fully comply with 
all its mandates.12 Although the lack of funding affects the 
Commission and Court, it is particularly evident in the individ-
ual petition system and the rapporteurships of the Commission.
In 2012, the Commission received approximately 2,000 
complaints, an increase of 400% over fifteen years. Since 1997, 
the rate of petitions has increased exponentially and continues 
to increase between five and twenty percent every year. One of 
the main consequences of deficient funding is the delay in the 
processing of petitions. During these years, the other mandates 
of the Commission have also increased significantly, particularly 
due to the creation of new and more active rapporteurships. 
Out of the nine special procedures that exist today, only two 
existed prior to 1997, and their role was limited to mainly pro-
motional activities. In spite of the increase of petitions and new 
mandates, during the same time the OAS’s regular budget for 
the Commission increased only marginally. A rough estimate 
indicates that if the Commission’s budget had increased in the 
same proportion as the rise in the number of petitions received 
and rapporteurships created, today the total budget for the 
Commission should be around USD $15 million.
graPh 1: growth of PetItIonS receIVed relatIVe  
to regular fundS
In order to address this problem, the Commission initiated 
a campaign to get more funds from both the OAS and exter-
nal sources. The efforts within the OAS resulted in very small 
increases. However, thanks to external funds, the Commission 
was able to double its regular budget. A significant percentage of 
the external funding came from European countries. The increase 
in funding was mainly allocated to the two areas with more need: 
the individual petition system and the rapporteurships.
As a consequence of securing outside funding, in the course 
of only three years the Commission was able to reduce the 
delay in the processing of cases in the initial review stage from 
an average of fifty months to an average of approximately 25 
months. Regarding the rapporteurships, in addition to several 
more promotional activities, the Commission produced approxi-
mately 45 reports during that time, compared with only a couple 
during the years before. With this progress amidst only modest 
increases in funding, this fact cannot be underestimated: The 
vast majority of the challenges faced by the Commission could 
be resolved with an adequate budget.
The drafters of the Convention stated very clearly, without 
any possibility of misinterpretation, the importance of the 
budget for a well-functioning Commission in Article 40 of 
the American Convention by unequivocally expressing that 
the Secretariat “be provided with the resources required to 
accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the Commission.”13 The 
Secretary General and Member States have failed to comply 
with the responsibilities under Article 40. If the budget is a more 
truthful reflection of the will of the States and the Secretary 
General, Chart 2 shows the gap between the rhetoric of Member 
States and the actual OAS objectives. The budget for 2012, 
including external funds, divided by allocation to the main areas, 
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Over the years, the Commission has presented different 
options to the OAS for increasing the budget of the System. 
During the reform process in the late 1990s, the Commission 
requested a five-year gradual budget increase in order to reach a 
total of ten percent of the overall OAS budget. This proposal was 
accepted as part of the negotiations during the reform process; 
however, the Member States never followed through with the 
agreed upon budget increases.
In 2007, the Permanent Council approved a proposal pre-
sented by Colombia to create a Voluntary Trust Fund for the 
IASHR, the Oliver Jackman Voluntary Capital Fund.14 The 
goal of the fund was to establish a source of money for volun-
tary contributions to finance the operations of the Court and 
Commission with income produced by capital contributions.15
The Fund was modeled after the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(CCJ), where in order to avoid governmental attempts to influ-
ence judgments “favorable to this or that” country, they created 
an independent Trust Fund of USD $100 million.16 This model 
was presented to the Secretary General in 2008 so he could 
engage in a conversation with the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB). However, as of December 2012, the Oliver 
Jackman Fund still has little more than the initial contribution 
from Colombia, totaling USD $152,000.17
Ultimately, the solution to the Commission and Court bud-
get challenges rests in a more profound change discussed at the 
OAS for at least two decades: the reform of the OAS itself. A 
profound change of the OAS structure would not only help to 
address the problems of the human rights system budget but 
more importantly would facilitate the design of a more efficient 
OAS with an emphasis on its most valuable areas of influence: 
democracy and human rights.
oaS reform wIth a human rIghtS and democratIc 
PerSPectIVe
Latin American experts, diplomats, politicians, members of 
academia, and civil society from all over the Americas tend to 
chart 2: 2012 ProgrammatIc areaS relatIVe 
PartIcIPatIon by fund, In thouSandS of uS dollarS 
(Source: oAS ProgrAm Budget of the orgAnizAtion)
Programmatic 












Policy Direction 6,631.6 1,852.5 8,484.1
Support for the 
Member States
17,146.2 1,893.3 19,039.5
Human Rights 6,940.7 3,600.4 10,541.1




TOTAL 85,350.8 72,936.4 158,287.1
graPh 2: 2012 Program-budget by ProgrammatIc 
areaS, all fundS
graPh 3: 2012 coe Program budget  
by ProgrammatIc areaS
agree that the OAS is outdated and in desperate need of reform. 
In the current regional and global order, it is difficult to imag-
ine how the OAS could have a leading role in the hemispheric 
architecture unless it undergoes significant change. Regrettably, 
in recent years it seems the Secretary General and some States 
sadly prefer oblivion to change. The risk of this option is that 
the fall of the OAS would also take down the few things that are 
working well, like the human rights system.
Most experts agree that the “Jewels of the Crown” within the 
OAS are the Commission and Court, apart from a few distinct 
projects like election observations. The remaining OAS activi-
ties not pertaining to democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law can either be reduced, continued outside the OAS umbrella, 
transitioned into self-sustaining entities, or might not be neces-
sary and can be eliminated altogether.
Any reform should strictly concentrate the OAS mandate 
to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. In so doing, 
the reform needs to be clear that many of the mandates of the 
Commission, as mentioned in the first part of this article, are 
directly related to the strengthening of democracy and the rule 
of law. Therefore it follows that some activities that today fall 
under the Secretary General of the OAS could be streamlined 
and carried out more effectively by the Commission.
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The first step in the OAS reform process should come with 
a budget that more clearly reflects the organization’s priori-
ties. The counterpart to the OAS in the European system is the 
Council of Europe (COE). The COE has 47 Members States for 
a total of 800 million people and priorities similar to those of 
the OAS — its primary aim is to ensure respect for its funda-
mental values: human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.18 
Similarly, the OAS’s four main pillars are democracy, human 
rights, security, and development.19
With the exception of development, the goals of the two bod-
ies are essentially the same. The OAS’s pillar of multi-dimen-
sional security is covered under the rule of law priority of the 
COE in programs related to organized crime, money laundering, 
terrorism, cybercrime, and trafficking in human beings. While 
the priorities are very similar, a look at the two budgets shows 
the gap between the rhetoric and the practice in both organiza-
tions. The COE allocates about 36% to human rights20 and the 
OAS allocates seven percent.21
The mandates of the COE and the OAS do diverge with 
regard to the work on development. The OAS mandate on devel-
opment is included in the OAS Charter and represents the largest 
percentage of the OAS budget in program-related activities. In 
2012 development represented 24% of the OAS budget.22 No 
significant change of the OAS budget, and therefore of the bud-
gets of the Commission and Court, will occur without a serious 
discussion about development.
The OAS Member States should review the role of the OAS 
in development and let the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), together with the Comisión Andina de Fomento (CAF) 
and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), take the lead on 
development in the region.
Article 1 of the OAS agreement establishing the IDB states 
in its first line that “[t]he purpose of the Bank shall be to 
contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic develop-
ment of the member countries, individually and collectively.”23 One 
obstacle to fully incorporating all of the OAS development activity 
within the IDB is the fact that not all Caribbean Member States of 
the OAS are members of the IDB. This potential obstacle to strictly 
limiting the mandate of the OAS to human rights and democracy 
should be addressed by both institutions in order to guarantee full 
access of all Caribbean states to the benefits of the IDB.
The CAF today includes sixteen countries from Latin 
America and the Caribbean24 and its goal is to “promote sus-
tainable development and regional integration through efficient 
resource mobilization for the timely delivery of multiple, high 
added value financial services to public and private clients in our 
shareholder countries.”25
The CDB includes eighteen countries from the Caribbean26 
and operates under the goal of being the leading catalyst for 
development efforts within the region by working with CDB 
members and other development partners toward the system-
atic reduction of poverty in their countries through social and 
economic development.
With an annual budget of approximately USD $38 million, 
the OAS’s impact in development, in comparison with over USD 
$10 billion in development funds among the three main regional 
institutions, is clearly insignificant.
The work of the IDB, together with the CAF and the CDB, 
makes it unnecessary for the OAS to continue its work on devel-
opment, particularly at the expense of democracy and human 
rights. Although there are differences in development work 
among these institutions, in the context of a new OAS, the cur-
rent programs that are unique to the OAS could be incorporated 
into the other institutions.
The streamlining of the OAS by narrowing its mandates 
to human rights, democracy and the rule of law should 
represent a correlating significant increase to the budgets of 
the Commission and Court.
creatIon of new StructureS
The restructuring of the OAS should also advance the creation 
of new structures that could address some of the issues that 
today’s OAS ignores but are necessary for an OAS more receptive 
to the region’s new challenges.
Establish a Venice Commission for the Americas
One criticism from Member States is that the Commission 
does not entirely fulfill its advisory role in relation to govern-
ments. From a strictly formal analysis, this criticism is baseless. 
Over the last thirteen years, only Colombia has requested advice 
under Article 41(e) of the American Convention. And in that 
case, the Commission responded immediately. The Commission 
also responded in a few other instances when a request was for-
mally presented, although not through the provision of Article 
41(e), as was the case with the request of Peru in the situation 
regarding the appropriate tribunal for the trial of Montesinos and 
the right to due process.
The Commission is far from being able to respond to all 
requests by Member States for advice and support on issues such 
as legislative reforms, public policies, and electoral disputes. 
Budget constraints, as well as the possibility of a conflict of interest 
should its advice ever come into play in an individual petition 
brought before the Commission, seriously limit the ability 
of the Commission to respond in many of the cases.
The European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
better known as the Venice Commission, is an excellent 
model to consider in the Americas.27 It is an advisory body on 
constitutional matters composed of independent experts. The 
OAS should establish such an independent body composed 
of independent experts who could respond to the requests the 
Commission receives. There should be formal channels of com-
munication between the new advisory body and the IACHR in 
order to ensure the incorporation of a human rights perspective 
in any advice given by such a body.
Permanent Commissioners and Judges
It is no longer possible to continue with the model designed 
in 1959 of temporary members ad honorem serving as 
Commissioners and Judges. With the ever-increasing number of 
petitions, it is necessary to have a Commission and Court staffed 
with permanent, professional members. Although some positive 
steps have been taken in this direction, the technically part-
time Commissioners and Judges continue to receive inadequate 
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honorariums and spend an inordinate amount of time working 
for the Commission and Court.
Additional Special Rapporteurships Following the 
Freedom of Expression Model
The rapporteurships of the Commission28 play an integral role 
in highlighting issues that deserve special attention by the interna-
tional community. Originally, the work of the rapporteurships was 
mainly promotional and until 1998 all rapporteurships were car-
ried out by a Commissioner. In 1998 the Commission created the 
Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression as a perma-
nent office with one person selected by the Commission working 
full-time and with a mandate expanded beyond just promotional 
activities. In addition, in 2001 the Executive Secretary created the 
Unit of Human Rights Defenders, which since 2008 has been led 
by a Commissioner and in 2012 became a rapporteurship. Also in 
2011, the Commission created the Unit on the Rights of Lesbian, 
Gay, Trans, Bisexual, and Intersex 
Persons (LGTBI), which is also led by 
a Commissioner.
Today, as a consequence of these 
developments, the Commission 
has seven rapporteurships, one 
special rapporteur, and one unit. 
Commissioners fulfill all roles except 
that of the Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression. Based on the evolution of 
the System and the experience of the 
UN special procedure system, it is very 
likely the Commission will create addi-
tional rapporteurships. It goes against 
any rationale to limit the amount of 
rapporteurships to the amount of 
Commissioners, as if there will never 
be more than seven important issues.
With the increasing number of petitions and country visits, it 
will become very difficult for the Commissioners to be able to 
dedicate the time needed to ensure that the mandates of the rap-
porteurships and units receive the special attention and expertise 
required, even if they are employed full-time.
The Commissioners are selected for their “recognized com-
petence in the field of human rights”29 and not necessarily for 
their special expertise on any particular human rights issue. The 
work of the rapporteurships has also expanded from the original 
promotional activities to a more active mandate; in many cases, 
the knowledge and experience of the Commissioners might not 
be sufficient to carry out the expanded responsibilities.
A stronger IASHR should contemplate more special rappor-
teurships following the model of the Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression, which is the best way to guarantee that these special 
mandates will benefit from an expert in the field and that the 
issue will get the requisite attention.
Freedom of Expression for all Sectors
The OAS is very outdated when it comes to welcoming the 
voices of the political opposition to governments. The voices 
of the opposition are strongly silenced by Member States. Few 
things will strengthen the democratic systems and the respect 
for human rights throughout the Americas more than the pos-
sibility for opposition leaders to, at the very least, be provided 
an opportunity to express their views within the OAS. The his-
tory of Latin America would be dramatically different today if 
throughout the 1970s opposition leaders had the opportunity to 
express their views on the atrocities taking place at that time. 
Countless deaths may have been prevented.
The argument that today because all Member States are 
democracies there is consequently no need for the opposition to 
express its views is one that does not even pass an elementary 
test on democracy and freedom of expression. The European 
System benefits from the European Parliament, which allows for 
a range of voices from Member States to express their views. If 
the OAS wants to be a beacon of democracy and human rights 
in the Americas, it must reform itself to allow other voices to 
participate in the political debate.
In addition, the OAS should have 
a systematic approach to allow civil 
society to participate in the discus-
sions. Although civil society enjoys 
more opportunities than opposition 
leaders, non-governmental organiza-
tions’ participation is still subject to 
a case-by-case determination without 
a clear and transparent procedure for 
regular participation.
General Assembly
The regular General Assembly of 
the OAS has lost its significance. 
Only Extraordinary Assemblies have, 
on occasion, some relevance, such as 
when they are called to address an 
issue that affects democracy and human rights. Most of the work 
during the regular General Assembly session is either completely 
unnecessary or could easily be handled by the Permanent Council.
However, if the OAS can modify its mandates to concen-
trate primarily on human rights and democracy, the General 
Assembly could become relevant once again by spending the 
time and energy to discuss the work of the OAS in these two 
fields. Today, the combined time given to the Commission and 
the Court during the General Assemblies is no more than fifteen 
minutes. Most of the time, there is absolutely no discussion of 
the activities carried out during the year by these two bodies. 
In the last fifteen years, the only discussions about the System 
took place in El Salvador in 2011 and Bolivia in 2012, and those 
instances were both to discuss the reform process, not necessar-
ily to discuss strengthening the System.
A more effective regional system for the protection of human 
rights should include a General Assembly that meets every year 
to discuss the reports of the Commission and Court. After the 
presentations of the Presidents of the two bodies, the Special 
Rapporteur on Compliance should inform the Member States 
of the status of compliance and provide recommendations for 
follow up.
The first step in the OAS 
reform process should come with 
a budget that more clearly reflects 
the organization’s priorities. If 
the OAS wants to be a beacon 
of democracy and human rights 
in the Americas, it must reform 
itself to allow other voices to 
participate in the political debate.
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concluSIon
For at least the last fifteen years, the Commission and Court 
have regularly expressed to the Member States of the OAS the 
need to strengthen the System through significant increases in 
the budget, the ratification by all States of the human rights 
treaties, and increased compliance with the decisions of the 
Commission and Court. These requests have consistently been 
ignored by most States and the General Secretariat, in spite 
of the constant expressions of support by presidents, foreign 
ministries, ambassadors, secretaries general, and civil society 
organizations.
All the recent attempts initiated by Member States to 
strengthen the System have, on the contrary, been characterized 
by requests for reforms oriented toward changes that will mainly 
limit the Commission’s ability to defend and protect millions of 
people in the Americas from human rights violations committed 
by the States.
The extraordinary achievements of the Commission and 
Court in defending and protecting human rights and the rule of 
law in the Americas have increased the demands from individu-
als and civil society organizations throughout the Americas for 
an even more active System. The Commission and Court are not 
able to respond in full to the new demands, mainly because the 
OAS General Secretariat and some Member States have not fol-
lowed up with the promises made to increase the budget of the 
Commission and Court.
A serious strengthening of the System should take into 
consideration the new hemispheric reality of an OAS that is no 
longer the relevant political forum of decades ago. The strength-
ening of the System should therefore start by acknowledging 
this reality and by reforming the OAS to focus its work on 
democracy and human rights. A reform based on that ground 
will not only strengthen the human rights protection for mil-
lions of people all over the Americas, but it will also result in a 
reinvigorated OAS.
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